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ORGANISING FOR HIGH RELIABILITY IN 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL LINK
SUMMARY
Australian emergency agencies aim to be high reliability organisations – that is, to be 
consistently relatively error-free and make consistently good decisions which result in 
high quality and reliable operations. To this end, they use an emergency management 
system known as AIIMS – Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System, 
designed to enable the integration of activities and resources from several agencies – 
when responding to critical incidents.
This Fire Note reports on an 
investigation into the principles 
supporting high reliability 
organising (HRO) and 
adaptive teamwork practices 
in the management of fire and 
emergencies in Australia and 
New Zealand. 
Personnel were asked to 
report on an incident they 
were involved with and give 
their assessment of the AIIMS 
processes at work. They were 
also asked about the teamwork 
practices they might have 
experienced. Respondents 
included people on the ground 
at the fire or other emergency, Incident Management Teams, and staff in regional and 
state coordination centres. The findings demonstrate that AIIMS is necessary but not 
sufficient on its own for organisations to achieve HRO. 
When AIIMS-endorsed practices also include high degrees of distributed sensemaking 
(the actions members in different groups and/or locations take to make meaning 
of a situation) and flexibility (in the actions personnel are able to take themselves), 
personnel report better information flow and manifestly fewer problems doing their 
job. These findings demonstrate an empirical link between certain emergency incident 
management practices and high reliability organising. 
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The 2008 AIIMS questionnaire was, in 
part, designed to empirically test the 
extent of any links between the organising 
principles underpinning so-called high 
reliability organisations and teamwork 
practices of those involved in managing 
fire and emergency incidents. Few if any 
studies have attempted to do this, despite 
the fact that in the United States, fire and 
emergency management agencies are 
enthusiastically embracing the principles 
of High Reliability Organising (HRO).
BACKGROUND
To obtain consistently good results in fire 
and emergency management, there is a 
clear need to “manage the unexpected”. 
even minor lapses or mistakes can lead to 
untenable losses. for Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001), organising for “high reliability” 
means that organisations need to be 
more aware of their capabilities and of 
what “managing the unexpected” might 
mean for operational personnel. The 
principles underpinning HRO are being 
enthusiastically embraced in emergency 
management across the united States (for an 
outline of the HRO principles, see Table 1, 
page 2). 
Organising for high reliability is obviously 
also important in Australia. The intent of 
AIIMS (and CIMS in New Zealand) is to 
provide a framework that allows the core unit, 
the Incident Management Team, to expand as 
the incident grows in size or complexity. 
There has been virtually no research to 
empirically test (a) how much an AIIMS 
structured organisation might align with the 
principles of organising for high reliability, 
or (b) establish what links may exist 
between HRO principles and the capacity 
of personnel to adapt while still attaining 
high quality performance. To have relevance 
within Australian agencies it is imperative 
that the benefits, if any, of HRO within work 
practices be established. This research is one 
of the first studies to make this possible.
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Two questions were asked: 
How much do incident management 1. 
personnel follow the principles of high 
reliability organising when interacting 
with others involved in emergency 
incident management? 
When they do so, does this make a 2. 
difference to incident management 
performance?
The researchers used indicators drawn from 
the literature to develop examples for the 
questionnaire that demonstrated the HRO 
concepts (see Table 2, page 3). Successful 
performance was measured in two ways: 
Whether they had high scores on a •	
scale measuring quality of information 
available
Whether people reported they were able •	
to effectively do their job (or conversely 
whether there were inhibiting factors 
in this regard which resulted in 
unsuccessful performance).
The questionnaire was completed by 543 
people in different layers within the AIIMS 
structure – 109 (19%) worked directly on 
the fire or other incident, 375 (65%) were in 
Incident Management Teams (IMT), and 59 
(10%) were engaged in regional or state-level 
coordination. Of those in IMT, 112 (19%) 
were incident controllers or deputy incident 
controllers, 96 (17%) were in Operations, 107 
(18%) were in Planning, and 60 (10%) were 
in Logistics. The average number of years 
respondents had acted in their respective roles 
was nine to 13 years.
Respondents were asked to give their 
perceptions on a range of indicators of 
information flow and teamwork within the 
AIIMS system. They were asked to think 
about one incident and to identify:
The characteristics of that incident•	
Whether they received a briefing or •	
incident action plan
Whether particular risk management •	
and assessment tools were in use
Whether particular teamwork •	
indicators were in use.
The researchers believed that the degree 
to which AIIMS procedures would use the 
principles of Weick and Sutcliffe’s HRO 
model would, in part, be most obvious in 
personal interactions. Since interactions 
within Incident Management Teams and 
teams on the ground at critical incidents is 
frequently identified as a weak link, they 
were particularly interested in investigating 
interactions at these levels in the Incident 
Control System.
RESEARCH OUTCOMES
The AIIMS system contains a number 
of embedded practices that support the 
principles of HRO. for example, being 
systematic in having a briefing that covers key 
elements identified to be important, having 
an Incident Action Plan and having charge 
over arrangements to ensure continuity 
of knowledge. The results show that these 
practices are widely used.
However, weaknesses were also reported. 
Only one third of people reported that the 
briefing or the incident action plan included 
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any reference to alternative strategies. In Level 
3 incidents (i.e. the most complex), only 38% 
of people reported that the briefing included 
alternative strategies. This has implications 
for HRO because in HROs it is important that 
personnel are sensitive to operations so that 
they can pick up weak signals of things going 
wrong. Researchers also noticed in the data 
that the interaction indicators used to assess 
“preoccupation with failure” (see Table 1, this 
page) did not make a difference to reported 
performance.
The researchers specifically asked questions 
about the quality of IMT interactions on 
the ground at the fire or incident. They then 
analysed the information using appropriate 
statistical procedures to establish whether 
there was an empirical link.
using the items included in the questionnaire 
(see Table 2, page 3) the researchers computed 
an HRO interaction scale between IMT 
and ground crews – the IMT/fire-Ground 
interaction scale – which included the two 
dimensions of distributed sensemaking (the 
actions members in different groups and/or 
locations take to make meaning of a situation) 
and flexibility (in the actions personnel 
are able to take themselves), and divided 
responses evenly into three groups: low, 
medium and high (i.e. respondents who gave 
high scores to the interaction items in Table 2 
would be high on the HRO scale). The HRO 
scale was then used to predict other items 
measured in the questionnaire.
The scale significantly predicted responses 
on a Quality of Information scale (see figure 
1, page 4). Where respondents reported 
higher levels on the HRO scale they received 
higher quality information. There was also 
a positive association between measures on 
the HRO scale and answers to the question 
“Were there any factors that prevented 
you from effectively doing your job?”. for 
example, more than half the people (52%) 
who reported low levels on the distributed 
sensemaking dimension between the IMT 
and the fire-ground also experienced 
obstacles to doing their job well. Conversely, 
people who had the highest scores on the 
distributed sensemaking dimension of 
the HRO scale reported that they did not 
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This is a project of national significance. 
developing organisational systems and 
strategies that support high reliability 
organising is critical. The findings will 
help agencies to better respond in fire 
and emergency events.”
– Craige Brown, 
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Operations Support, 
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Table 1: HRO principles (source: Wilson, Burke, Priest & Salas, 2005)
HRO value Organisational level concern
1. Pre-occupation with 
failure
encourage error reporting•	
Accept human error as inevitable•	
Obsession with avoiding overconfidence•	
2. Reluctance to 
simplify
unwillingness to simplify a situation•	
Create more complete pictures of situations•	
encourage spanning of boundaries, negotiating, scepticism •	
and differences in opinions
3. Sensitivity to 
operations
Ongoing concern with the unexpected•	
Attentiveness to those on the front line•	
Acknowledgement that the cause of an accident is often not •	
the result of a single active error but rather multiple slips and 
lapses that can be latent (present but inactive) in the system
4. Commitment to 
resilience
Ability to identify, control, and recover from errors•	
errors and failures kept small•	
Practice worse case scenarios•	
develop strategies to expect and react to the unexpected•	
5. deference to 
expertise
encourages communication of expertise from all levels•	
decisions made on the front line•	
Migrate decision-making to its lowest possible level•	
Cultivate diversity•	
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Table 2: Example of Items included in the AIIMS questionnaire as indicators of the HRO concepts 
HRO Principle (refer Table 1) Research Outcome 
Dimensions
1. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel exchanged information 
clearly and accurately.
2 Reluctance to simply interpretations, 
3 Sensitivity to operations
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
2. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel provided helpful advice to 
each other.
5 deference to expertise 1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
3. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel provided constructive 
feedback to each other.
3 Sensitivity to operations,  
5 deference to expertise
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
4. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel effectively monitored each 
other’s performance.
3 Sensitivity to operations 1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
6. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel interacted in an open and 
honest manner.
3 Sensitivity to operations,  
5 deference to expertise
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
7. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel kept each other well 
informed about work-related issues.
2 Reluctance to simply interpretations 
3 Sensitivity to operations
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
8. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel made genuine attempts to 
share information with each other
3 Sensitivity to operations,  
5 deference to expertise
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
9. In discussion between the IMT and the fire/Incident Ground, 
potential weaknesses in what was being undertaken were critically 
appraised.
1 Pre-occupation with failure;  
2 Reluctance to simply interpretations
3 Sensitivity to operations
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
10. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel shared their individual 
knowledge with each other
3 Sensitivity to operations
5 deference to expertise
1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
11. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel were able to state and 
maintain opinions openly with each other.
2 Reluctance to simply interpretations 1: distributed Situation 
Awareness
13. Strategies were adjusted in a timely manner as the incident unfolded. 4 Commitment to resilience 2 flexibility
14. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel anticipated the needs of 
others.
3 Sensitivity to operations 2 flexibility
15. Roles were effectively re-allocated as the situation changed. 4 Commitment to resilience 2 flexibility
16. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel interacted effectively with 
external stakeholders beyond the fire/Incident Ground.
2 Reluctance to simply interpretations 2 flexibility
18. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel trusted each other. 2 Reluctance to simply interpretations 
4 Commitment to resilience
2 flexibility
20. When problems arose, IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel 
were able to recover quickly and get on with the job.
4 Commitment to resilience 2 flexibility
21. IMT and fire/Incident Ground personnel felt that they contributed 
to the decision making.
5 deference to expertise 2 flexibility
experience factors that prevented them from 
effectively doing their job.
The flexibility dimension showed similar 
results. People reporting higher levels 
of flexibility reported that they did not 
experience obstacles to doing their job. 
The findings clearly demonstrate that 
when interactions between the IMT and 
those on the ground at the emergency 
have stronger elements of distributed 
sensemaking and flexibility then 
emergency personnel have better quality 
of information and manifestly fewer 
problems in doing their job. The results 
also indicate that the flexibility and 
resilience required to respond to changing 
and unpredictable events is in part based 
on practices between the IMT and those at 
the coalface.
In conclusion, AIIMS provides a set of 
organisational processes that are necessary 
but not sufficient to provide high reliability 
organising. When personnel use the 
information flow tools (e.g. briefings, 
incident action plans, risk-assessment tools) 
and engage in high quality interaction that 
includes attention to distributed sensemaking 
and flexibility, then they begin to achieve 
HRO.
HOW COULD THE RESEARCH BE USED?
These insights can be used in three ways. 
first, the survey items can be used as baseline 
indicators with which agencies can identify 
a need for improvements and monitor their 
own performance. The data, including the 
baseline indicators and other scales, are being 
sent to agencies for their consideration. In this 
respect agencies will have measures they can 
use to assess the impact of any future change 
in organisational practice.
Second, agencies can also use the indicators to 
review their practices and evaluate how their 
policies and procedures support IMT fire or 
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  distribution of low, moderate and high scores on HRO dimensions by whether or not respondents 
experienced blockages to effectively being able to do their work. 
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Figure 1: Link between HRO indicators and indicators of 
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Incident Ground interaction. for example, to 
what degree are personnel currently able to 
reallocate roles within their respective teams 
(item #15 Table 2, page 3)? 
Third, the findings can be translated into 
indicators for training and performance 
assessment that support development of the 
needed teamwork skills to enable HRO.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There is a need to better understand how 
to support the development of adaptive 
expertise in people, organisational systems 
and technologies. for example, how might 
adaptation and improvisation be enabled 
during an escalating event? In what ways 
might the incident management system need 
to “flex” to support the people managing  
the incident? And conversely, what skills  
and attributes are needed in those  
personnel to be able to adapt and make 
the most of the resources available in these 
conditions? What inhibits personnel and 
systems from successfully doing so? 
Given current predictions of the increased 
likelihood of more extreme weather events, a 
better understanding in the future of these sorts of 
communication and coordination issues is critical.
